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Articles

I

Medellin, the President's Foreign Affairs
Power and Domestic Law
A. Mark Weisburd*
Abstract
In this article, Professor Weisburd explores the implications of
Medellin v. Texas for the President's authority to affect domestic law
through reliance on his authority to conduct the foreign affairs of the
United States. He argues that the Court was correct to reject arguments
that, on the facts of the case, the Presidentcould look to a delegation of
authority from Congress or from the Senate as treaty-maker, or that
Presidentcould treat the matter as resting on his power to settle claims
againstforeign governments, or that the President'sobligation to "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed" would provide the necessary
grounding for his action. He also argues that there are reasons to
support the Court's result stronger than those that appear in its opinions,
and that critics' arguments are not very convincing. Finally, he suggests
some implications of the result in Medellin.

* Martha M. Brandis Professor of Law, School of Law, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the
Carolina Law Foundation in the preparation of this article.
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INTRODUCTION

It sometimes happens that important court decisions receive less
attention than one might expect, especially if they are handed down more
or less simultaneously with decisions in cases which, while no more
important, have a higher profile. A case in point is Medellin v. Texas,
decided by the Supreme Court on March 25, 2008.1 Non-specialist
observers see it as less significant than Boumediene v. Bush,2 at least
judging by comparing the number of references to each case in the New
York Times 3 since their dates of decision. Of course, Boumediene's
importance cannot be gainsaid; its holding that prisoners at Guantanamo
Bay had the right to seek relief through the writ of habeas corpus 4 is a
significant statement regarding the limitations on the power of the United
States government in wartime. But Medellin presented issues arguably
even more fundamental; that case forced the court to address a claim of
presidential power, not supported by any statute, that was breath-taking
in scope. 5 The Court's rejection of that claim was phrased in terms that
1. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
2. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
3. In a Lexis/Nexis search on June 15, 2009, seeking all references to the cases
since their dates of decision, only seven references to Medellin were found (not counting
letters to the editor), but there were twenty-seven references to Boumediene.
4. See Boumediene, 2229 S. Ct. at 2240.
5. See generallyMedellin, 552 U.S. 491.
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appear to limit strictly the President's authority in an area whose
boundaries have been very murky indeed.
Medellin also presented important issues of treaty interpretation,
and this article cannot avoid reference to those issues. Its focus,
however, will be on the breadth of the claim of executive power raised in
Medellin, that case's treatment of that claim, and the implications for the
future of American foreign relations law presented by the Court's
reasoning.

II.

BACKGROUND

In 1994, Jos6 Ernesto Medellin, a Mexican national, was sentenced
to death by a Texas court after his conviction for his role in the rapes and
murders of two teenage girls. 6 Although Texas authorities were required7
Relations
by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
("Consular Convention") to inform Medellin of his right to consult the
Mexican consul, they failed to do so.8 Mexican authorities did not learn
of Medellin's situation until 1997, after he had exhausted his direct
appeals. Medellin then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the Texas9
obligations;
courts, based on Texas' failure to carry out its Article 36
this relief was finally denied in October, 2001.10
In the meantime, in June, 2001, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) had decided the LaGrand Case, brought by Germany against the
United States because of the violation by Arizona authorities of the
Article 36 rights of two German nationals. 1 The ICJ held in LaGrand
that, for individuals denied their Article 36 rights, the Consular
Convention created a right to review and reconsideration of their
rules.12
sentences, notwithstanding otherwise applicable waiver
13
courts,
federal
the
from
Medellin thereupon sought habeas corpus relief
arguing that American courts were bound by the ICJ's interpretation of
the Consular Convention in LaGrand.14 This argument failed at the
6. See Medellin. at 501-02.
7. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes
art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Consular

Convention].
8. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 501.
9. See id.
10. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 662,
Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928) (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter Dretke Amicus Brief]; Reply Brief for Petitioner at 5-7, Medellin v. Dretke,
544 U.S. 660 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2005) (No. 04-5928) [hereinafter Dretke Petitioner's
Brief].
11. See LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27), 40 I.L.M. 1068 (2001).
12. See id. at % 75-77, 79-91.
13. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 502.

14.

See Dretke Petitioner's Brief, supra note 10, at 5.
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district court level;1 5 before the Court of Appeals heard Medellin's
appeal from that determination, the ICJ decided the Case Concerning
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals,16 a claim by Mexico against the
United States on behalf of fifty-two Mexican nationals, including
Medellin, who had been sentenced to death in several American states
but had not been timely informed of their Article 36 rights.17 The ICJ in
Avena held that fifty-one of these persons, including Medellin,' 8 were
entitled to a review and reconsideration of their sentences, 1 9 even though,
under the procedural rules of the relevant American states, all of them
had waived their rights to raise this issue through their failures to raise it
at their trials. 20
Back in the United States, the Court of Appeals hearing Medellin's
appeal of the denial of his habeas corpus petition took note of Avena, but
rejected Medellin's argument. 21 Medellin thereupon sought Supreme
Court review, but before oral argument, the United States filed an amicus
brief that-while it rejected Medellin's argument that Avena of its own
force imposed an obligation on American courts to accord relief to
him-argued that a memorandum from President Bush to Attorney
General Gonzales addressing Avena was dispositive. That memorandum
provided
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that
the United States will discharge its international obligations under the
decision of the International Court of Justice in [Avena], by having
State courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general
principles of comity in cases
filed by the 51 Mexican nationals
22
addressed in that decision.
According to the United States, Texas was legally obliged to conform to
the President's "determination," even if Avena otherwise would have no
effect in American domestic law.23 The Supreme Court dismissed
Medellin's appeal to permit the Texas courts to consider the implications
of the President's memorandum.24 The Texas courts held that neither

15. See Medellin, 522 U.S. at 502.
16. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31) [hereinafter Avena].
17. See Medellin, 522 U.S. at 540 (citing Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 12, 39).
18. See id. at 502 (citing Avena at 53-55).
19. See id. at 502-03 (quoting Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 72).
20. See id. at 503 (citing Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 56-57).
21. See id. at 503.
22. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 503.
23. See id. at 504.
24. See id. at 503 (citing Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 664 (2005)).
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denied Medellin any
Avena nor the memorandum bound them, and
26
relief. 25 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S OPINION

The bulk of the Supreme Court's opinion dealt with Medellin's
argument that obligations created by the Optional Protocol to the
Consular Convention 27 ("Optional Protocol"), Article 94 of the U.N.
Charter, 28 and/or the Statute of the ICJ, 29 taken together, bound
30
American state and federal courts to comply with the Avena judgment.
on the ground that none of these
The Court rejected this argument
31
self-executing.
were
treaties
More specifically, the Court held, first, that the Optional Protocol
had no effect other than conferring on the ICJ jurisdiction to hear
Mexico's claim, characterizing Article 94 of the Charter as the source of
countries' obligations to comply with ICJ judgments.32 It rejected the
argument that Article 94 was a self-executing treaty provision, holding
that it was non-self-executing.3 3 The Court explained its understanding
of the meaning of these terms as follows:
The label "self-executing" has on occasion been used to convey
different meanings. What we mean by "self-executing" is that the
treaty has automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification.
Conversely, a "non-self-executing" treaty does not by itself give rise
to domestically enforceable federal law. Whether such a treaty has
effect depends upon implementing legislation passed by
domestic 34
Congress.
As for Medellin's argument relying on the ICJ Statute, the Court held
that-so far from supporting his claim-the relevant articles of the
Statute established that Medellin could not be considered a party to a
case before the ICJ because, according to the Statute, only countries
could be parties to contentious cases before that Court,35 and its
25.

See id. at 504.

26. See id. at 504 (citing Medellin v. Texas, 550 U.S. 917 (2007)).
27. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 U.N.T.S. 487
[hereinafter Optional Protocol].
28. U.N. Charter art. 94 [hereinafter art. 94].
29. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 39
A.J.I.L. Supp. 215 (1945) [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
30. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506.
31. See id. at 505-06.
32. See id. at 507-08.
33. See id. at 508-11.
34. Id. at 505, n. 2.
35. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 511 (citing ICJ Statute, supra note 31, at art. 34(1)).
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judgments were binding
only as between the parties and with respect to
36
the case in question.
After disposing of Medellin's treaty-centered arguments, the Court
turned to the arguments with which this paper is concerned-those to the
effect that American courts were obliged to conform to the Avena
judgment because of the President's memorandum. 37 The Court, while
acknowledging the significant foreign affairs responsibilities of the
President, held that the President's authority had to be grounded either in
a statute or in the Constitution. 38 In this connection, the Court held that
the proper standard for evaluating the President's power in this area was
the familiar tripartite framework enunciated by Justice Jackson in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 39 It applied that framework to
the first argument of the United States: that, because the Optional
Protocol and Article 94 created an international legal obligation for the
United States, they implicitly give the President authority to meet that
obligation. The Court rejected this argument.4 ° It noted that, while the
President may resort to political or diplomatic means to carry out
international obligations, "unilaterally converting a non-self-executing

36. See id. (citing ICJ Statute, supra note 31, at arts. 34(1), 59).
37. See id. at 523.
38. See id. at 524 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
585 (1952); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981).
39. See id. at 524 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-638 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("I. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization
of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only,
may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act
is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal
Government as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure executed by the President
pursuant to an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and
the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest
heavily upon any who might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its
distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence
may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on
independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.
Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the
Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the
equilibrium established by our constitutional system.").
40. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 525.
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treaty into a self-executing one is not among them."'' 4 Rather, the Court
held, "the terms of a non-self-executing treaty can become domestic law
only in the same way as any other law-through passage of legislation
,42 Indeed, the Court went on to hold
by both Houses of Congress.
that, because the Senate consents to the ratification of a non-selfexecuting treaty on the understanding that it has no domestic effect of its
own force, Presidential enforcement of the treaty by creating domestic
law is "in conflict with the implicit understanding of the ratifying (sic)
Senate. 43 For that reason, the Court held, President Bush's action fell
within the third of Justice Jackson's categories. 4 The United States
attempted to fortify its position by pointing to what it called
Congressional acquiescence in the President's exercise of the power to
respond to ICJ judgments. The Court rejected that argument, pointing
out that the instances on which the government relied did not "remotely
involve[] transforming an international obligation into domestic law and
thereby displacing state law.",45 The government also argued that the
President's statutory obligation to represent the United States before
U.N. organs, including the ICJ, supported its claim to Presidential
authority, but the Court distinguished those responsibilities as involving
the President's international role, not unilateral Presidential creation of
domestic law.4 6

The Government's second argument was that President Bush's
memorandum should be seen as an instance of the President's wellestablished authority to resolve claims disputes with foreign countries
even absent Congressional action. 4 The Court distinguished the practice
to which the United States referred as involving only "the making of
executive agreements to settle civil claims between American citizens
and foreign governments or foreign nationals,, 48 and stressed that the
Court's upholding of the President's authority in that area was based on
an inference of Congressional consent, in light of the absence of
Congressional objection to the practice, even though it was long-standing
and known to Congress.4 9 The Court distinguished the action the
President sought to take in this case, however, as unprecedented, as the
government admitted; since such an action had never been attempted
before, the President's issuance of his memorandum could hardly be said
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 525-26.
Id. at 526-27.
Id. at 527.
See id.
Medellin, 552 U.S. at 528.
See id. at 529-30.
See id. at 531.

48. Id.
49.

See id.
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to have taken place against a background of long-standing congressional
acquiescence. 50 The Court stated
Indeed, the Government has not identified a single instance in which
the President has attempted (or Congress has acquiesced in) a
Presidential directive issued to state courts, much less one that
reaches deep into the heart of the State's police powers and compels
state courts to reopen final criminal judgments and set aside neutrally
applicable state laws.... The Executive's narrow and strictly limited
authority to settle international claims disputes pursuant to an
executive agreement cannot51 stretch so far as to support the current
Presidential Memorandum.
In addition to the arguments made by the United States supporting
the effectiveness of the President's memorandum, Medellin raised a
different one: that the memorandum could be upheld as an exercise of the
President's responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed., 52 The Court dismissed this argument, observing that "[t]his
authority allows the President to execute the laws, not make them, ' 53 and
held that, since that the Court had concluded that the Avena judgment
was not domestic law, the President could not rely on his take care
54
powers.
55
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment in a very short opinion.
Most of it was devoted to an explanation of Stevens's reasons for
agreeing with the Court's conclusions regarding the treaties on which
Medellin relied and to exhorting Texas to comply with the United
States's admitted international legal obligation respecting Medellin,
despite the absence of any obligation in domestic law for Texas to do
so.56 With respect to the effect of the President's memorandum, he
stated only, "I agree.., that the President's memorandum is not binding
law. Nonetheless, the fact that the President cannot legislate unilaterally
does not absolve the United States from its promise to take action
necessary to comply with the ICJ's judgment. 57
Justice Breyer's lengthy dissent focused on his conclusion that the
treaties Medellin cited required Texas to comply with the Avena
judgment as a matter of domestic law. 58 He expressly refused to take a
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 532.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
Medellin, 552 U.S. at 532.
See id.
See id. at 533-37 (Stevens, J. concurring).
See id.
Id. at 536.
See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 538-567 (Breyer, J.dissenting).
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position regarding the legal effect of the President's memorandum,
noting that "It is difficult to believe that in the exercise of his Article II
powers pursuant to a ratified treaty, the President can never take action
that would result in setting aside state law, 59 but adding "[o]n the other
hand, the Constitution must impose significant restrictions upon the
President's ability, by invoking Article II treaty-implementation
authority, to circumvent ordinary legislative processes and to pre-empt
state law as he does so." 60 In short, both of the separate opinions in
Medellin agreed with the Court that there are limits to the President's
authority to set aside state law, but neither is of much assistance in
assessing the majority's opinion on this issue.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION AND OF THE ARGUMENTS OF
CRITICS

A.

The Scope ofAuthority the PresidentClaimed

Consideration of Medellin and its implications requires an
understanding of the breadth of the claim the President made regarding
his memorandum. On the one hand, he asserted that American law
imposed no obligation on the courts to comply with the Avena judgment.
On the other, he claimed the authority to require such compliance
nonetheless. Furthermore, in purporting to require such compliance, the
President was, as the majority stated, "reach[ing] deep into the heart of
the State's police powers and compel[ling] state courts to reopen
final
61
criminal judgments and set aside neutrally applicable state laws."
To express the foregoing in greater, and probably excessive, detail,
the President purported to require the states to provide hearings to named
criminal defendants despite the fact that the judgments had become final
in their cases; he determined as well the subject matter of those hearings,
that is, whether the defendants were in some way negatively affected by
the denial of their rights under the Consular Convention. This action not
only sought to affect the finality of the judgments but also was intended
to set aside state procedural law regarding both the stage of proceedings
at which defendants were obliged to raise defenses and the consequences
of any failure to raise defenses at the point required. Furthermore, the
President's memorandum took no account of the fact that, in Medellin's
case at least, claims based on Article 36 of the Consular Convention had

59. Id. at 564.
60. Id. at 565.
61. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 532.
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in fact already been considered on the merits by both state and federal
courts considering habeas-corpus petitions.62
The Supreme Court characterized the memorandum as an exercise
in law-making 63 and, given the attempted alteration of the state's rules of
procedural default, that characterization is not unreasonable. It is worth
noting, however, that the action could also plausibly be called an
exercise of judicial authority. Just as a properly challenged judgment is
not final as far as an appellate court is concerned, so the President acted
as though the judgment in Medellin's case was not final as far as the
federal executive was concerned. Just as an appellate court could require
a trial court to reconsider a particular case in order to apply a rule of law
different from that the trial court had thought to be correct, so the
President treated the Texas courts as, in effect, having erred in their
application of procedural default rules in this particular case. Further,
the President took this position even as he simultaneously argued that,
but for his issuance of his memorandum, Texas had no legal obligation to

62. One of the more puzzling aspects of this litigation is the relative lack of attention
paid to the consideration already given to Medellin's Consular Convention claims in
post-conviction proceedings in both state and federal court. In his initial application for a
writ of habeas corpus from the Texas court, Medellin based his claim for relief for the
Consular Convention violation on the argument that this violation should have led to the
suppression of the confession he had made after receiving his Miranda warnings. Brief
for Respondent at 3, n.3, Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984)
[hereinafter Respondent's Brief]. The Texas court denied relief and, as an alternative
basis for its holding, relied on its conclusion that Medellin had failed to show that he had
been harmed by the violation of his Consular Convention rights. See Ex Parte Medellin,
Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Conclusions of
Law 16 (339th Dist. Ct., Harris Cty., Tex. 2001) (no. 675430-A)found in Respondent's
Appendix 39, 61, Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984) [hereinafter
Respondent's Appendix]. The court hearing Medellin's petition for a federal writ of
habeas corpus relied on a similar conclusion as an alternative basis for denying relief
See Medellin v. Cockrell, (S.D. Tex. 2003) (No. H-01-4078) found in Respondent's
Appendix, supra, at 66. However, even though the United States brought to the attention
of the ICJ the fact that Medellin's claims had been considered and rejected in postconviction proceedings in its memorial in the Avena case, Counter-Memorial for the
United States of America at 164, n. 360, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, and the ICJ's judgment acknowledges that some
Consular Convention claims had been raised in American courts and dismissed on
substantive grounds, id. at 20, the ICJ in awarding relief failed to distinguish between
those cases and others in which the persons denied their Consular Convention rights had
never been able to make an argument based on that denial. Nor does the President's
memorandum distinguish between cases in which Consular Convention claims had
received substantive consideration from a court and those in which no such consideration
had been afforded. Texas raised this point in its brief to the Supreme Court but put little
stress on it. See Respondent's Brief, supra, at 49-50.
63. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 532.
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to comply
provide any relief to Medellin, and that the decision whether
64
with the Avena judgment was a matter of his sole discretion.
One more aspect of the President's Memorandum also requires
discussion before we turn to the arguments addressed in Medellin. The
Court there stated
The President's Memorandum is ...[an] "unprecedented action."...
Indeed, the Government has not identified a single instance in which
the President has attempted (or Congress has acquiesced in) a
Presidential directive issued to state courts, much less one that
reaches deep into the heart of the State's police powers and compels
state courts to reopen 65final criminal judgments and set aside neutrally
applicable state laws.
But "reach[ing] deep into the heart of the State's police powers and
compel[ling] state courts to reopen final criminal judgments and set aside
neutrally applicable state laws"' 66 was not only something no president
has ever tried to do before this case, but something that had never been
done by the judiciary in the course of enforcing a judgment from a
foreign court or an international tribunal.67 Of course, American courts
frequently enforce awards of arbitral panels sitting overseas and
judgments of foreign courts, but those cases do not involve either the
panels or the foreign courts purporting to require an American court to
reopen a matter which has been finally decided. Again, the "fair and
equitable treatment" requirement of Article 1105 of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 68 has been interpreted as permitting
arbitral panels established under Chapter 11 of NAFTA to assess the
69
fairness of proceedings in American courts that have become final.
However, such panels have no authority to deprive a successful litigant
of his victory; losing litigants make their claim against the countries
whose justice systems have allegedly failed, NOT against the winning
litigants. 70 Furthermore, such panels have no authority to make an award
based solely on legal error; rather, an award based on the outcome of

64.
(2008)
65.
66.
67.

See Amicus Brief of the United States at 27-28, Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491
(No. 06-984) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
Medellin, 552 U.S. at 532 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
See id.

68. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1105, Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 605, 639 [hereinafter NAFTA].
39-60,
69. See Loewen Group, Inc. v. U.S., ICSID, Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3,
(Jan. 5, 2001) (decision on hearing of Respondent's objection to competence and
jurisdiction).
70.

See NAFTA, supra note 68, arts. 1115-16.
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private litigation is justified only if the panel sees the proceeding as
"clearly improper and discreditable. 7 1
Another effort to find a precedent for the relief Medellin sought was
his citation to the Court of two cases,-Comegys v. Vasse 72 and La Abra
Silver Mining Co. v. U.S., 73 as supporting "the proposition that the
judgments of international tribunals are automatically binding on
domestic courts. 74 The Court rejected the argument, characterizing both
as stating only that a treaty's terms control the outcome of a case
involving that treaty.7 5 In fact, although neither actually supports that
conclusion, they are both precedents that offer-no support at all for any
rule of automatic enforceability of the judgments of international
tribunals.
Comegys arose because of certain proceedings before a tribunal
established pursuant to an 1819 treaty between the United States and
Spain which addressed, among other things, Americans' claims against
Spain.76 Under this treaty, the United States agreed to establish a
tribunal, composed of Americans citizens appointed by the President by
and with the consent of the Senate, to adjudge Americans' claims against
Spain; such claims were voided by the treaty, except to the extent they
were pursued before the tribunal. The United States further agreed to
pay such claims as the tribunal found to be valid up to the amount of $
5,000,000.00. 71 (Incidentally, one might question the characterization of
this tribunal as "international" since, although its establishment was
required by a treaty, its members were Americans appointed by the
President, the claims it heard were made by Americans, and the awards it
made were paid out of U.S. government funds.)
Vasse was a marine insurer who had written policies protecting
American shippers against loss from, among other risks, the capture by
Spain of the insureds' ships.7 8 Some vessels covered by these policies
had been captured by Spain, and Vasse had paid the resulting claims. 79
He went bankrupt in 1802.80 His assignees in bankruptcy had brought a
claim before the 1819 treaty tribunal regarding the sums Vasse had paid
71. See Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. U.S., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2,

127, (Oct. 11,

2002).

72.

Comegys v. Vasse, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193 (1828).

73. La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. U.S., 175 U.S. 423 (1899).
74. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 519.

75. See id.; Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 12, 56-57 (Mar. 31).
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See Treaty of Amity, Settlement and Limits, U.S.-Sp., Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252.
See id. arts. 9, 11, 8 Stat. at 258-60.
See Comegys, 26 U.S. at 194.
See id.
See id.
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on losses caused his insureds by Spain; they were successful and
received an award. 81 Vasse then sued them for the award and won at
trial.82 The case was then taken to the Supreme Court.83 The Court held
that, while the courts were bound by the treaty tribunal's determination
of the validity of any particular claim, that tribunal lacked the authority
to determine the ownership of the claim. 84 Therefore, the fact that the
tribunal had made its award to the trustees did not preclude Vasse's
claim.8 5 In other words, so far from deferring to the tribunal, the Court
held that it was not bound by the fact that the tribunal had made its award
to the trustees. 86 While the opinion included language characterizing as
binding the tribunal's determinations regarding the validity of claims,
that language was dictum, since there was no dispute as to that point.
This case is thus inconsistent with any argument calling for absolute
deference to an international tribunal.
La Abra likewise does not seem to cut against the Court's
conclusion in Medellin. That case revolved around the award of a claims
commission established by a treaty between the United States and
Mexico to address the claims of the citizens of each country against the
other. 87 Its determinations were to be final. Under the treaty, any
monetary awards to claimants were to be paid by the government against
whom the award was made to the other government, which would then
distribute the payments to the claimants. 88 An American mining concern
made a claim to the commission in 1870 and received an award in its
favor in December, 1875.89 After the United States had received a
portion of the amount awarded to the company but before anything had
been paid to it, Mexico presented to the United States previously
unavailable evidence showing that the claim was fraudulent. 90 What
followed was a drawn out drama of which the La Abra decision was the
final act. First Congress, in 1878, authorized withholding of payment
until the matter was investigated. 91 After an investigation, the Secretary
of State concluded that there was good reason for suspicion, but doubted
that the United States could continue to withhold payment without
81. See id. at 194-95.
82. See id. at 195.
83. See Comegys, 26 U.S. at 193.
84. See id. at 219-20.
85. See id. at 210-21. The Court ultimately held for the trustees, however, on the
theory that the claims had in fact been part of the bankruptcy estate and thus had passed
to the trustees upon Vasse's bankruptcy. See id.
86. See id. at 220.
87. See La Abra, 175 U.S. at 425.
88. See id at 429.
89. See id. at 427.
90. See id. at 425-26.
91. See id. at 439-41.
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Congressional action. 92 Congress did not act, and the mining company
was paid approximately $240,000; the United States remained in
possession of a further $400,000 paid by Mexico in respect of this
award. 93 A new presidential administration suspended payment pending
negotiation between the United States and Mexico of a treaty permitting
reexamination of the case. 94 The treaty was signed in 1882, but was
eventually rejected by the Senate. 95 While the Senate was considering
the treaty, the Supreme Court held in Frelinghuysen v. Key 96 that the
97
President had the authority to withhold payment until the Senate acted.
Even after the treaty was rejected, presidents continued to withhold
payment; the Supreme Court upheld the executive's discretion to take
this action in Boynton v. Blaine,98 apparently construing the 1878
legislation as according the President this degree of discretion.99 Finally,
in 1892, Congress enacted a statute permitting the United States to sue
the mining company before the Court of Claims in order to address the
claims of fraud.100 The United States did so and the Court of Claims
held that the company in fact had engaged in fraud.10 ' La Abra was the
appeal from the Court of Claims decision, which the Supreme Court
affirmed. 102
It is true that, in the course of its opinion, the Court stated, "We
might well doubt the soundness of any conclusion that could be regarded
as weakening or tending to weaken the force that should be attached to
the finality of an award made by an international tribunal of
arbitration." 10 3 However, its opinion then immediately went on to
uphold the 1892 statute against an argument that it was somehow
disrespectful of the tribunal. The Court described the obligation of the
United States regarding the tribunal's award as one of execution in good
faith, and characterizing the legislation as "an assurance in the most
solemn and binding form" that the United States would force those of its
citizens who make claims against other governments to act in good
faith. 104

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

SeeLaAbra, 175 U.S. at 431-32.
See id at 428.
See id at 431.
See id. at 425-32.
Frelinghuysen v. Key, 110 U.S. 63 (1884).
See id. at 74-75.
Boynton v. Blaine, 139 U.S. 306 (1891).
See id. at 325-26.
See La Abra, 175 U.S. at 441.
at 447.
See id.
See id. at 440-47, 499-500.
Id.at 463.
See Id.
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Once again, the cited case turns out not be about the binding
character of a tribunal's award, and is thus irrelevant to Medellin. If
anything, this series of cases of which La Abra is the last seems to
recognize considerable discretion in the executive regarding such
awards, Frelinghuysen in particular stressing the President's discretion to
withhold payment of awards made by the tribunal while a treaty relevant
to the award in question is pending. 105
Professor Monaghan has argued that the arbitration held under the
auspices of the Treaty of Washington 10 6 after the Civil War amounted to
international review of a Supreme Court decision, and thus is relevant to
a consideration of the Constitutionality of the review of federal courts by
supranational courts. 10 7 That assertion, however, mischaracterizes the
actual character of these arbitrations. To be sure, the proceedings
involved claims by British nationals against the United States for, among
other things, condemnations of ships and cargoes by American prize
courts-including the Supreme Court - which allegedly applied incorrect
legal standards.10 8 However, the arbitration proceedings were "reviews"
in a sense quite different from the review by a superior court of the
actions of an inferior tribunal.
The arbitration awards were made
exclusively against the United States, which obviously had consented to
participate in the process. The U.S. naval personnel who had captured
the vessels in question were not participants, however, even though they
would have received at least 50% of the value of the condemned property
as prize money by virtue of the prize courts' allegedly illegal
judgments,' 09 and were also subject to damage claims if they had acted
unlawfully in capturing a particular vessel."l0 That is, while one of the
successful parties before the prize courts-the United States-could have
seen the elimination of any benefit it had realized by the condemnation,
that party had consented to subject itself to this risk. However, the
arbitration did not change results of the prize court proceedings as they
affected the captors of the vessels, who manifested no such consent.
See Frelinghuysen, 110 U.S. at 72-75.
106. Treaty Concerning Claims, Fisheries, Navigation of the St. Lawrence, etc.;
American Lumber on the St. John; Boundary, U.S.-U.K., May 8, 1871, 17 Stat. 863
(Treaty of Washington) (the panels were established by articles XII-XVII).
107. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and SupranationalJudicial Review, 107
105.

COLUM. L. REV. 833,860-62.
108. See JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 3902-57 (Washington:

Government Printing Office 1898).
109. See An Act for the Better Government of the Navy of the United States, §§ 5-6,
2 Stat. 49, 52-53 (1800).
110. See SIR THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, A MANUAL OF NAVAL PRIZE LAW: FOUNDED
UPON THE MANUAL PREPARED IN 1866 BY GODFREY LUSHINGTON 68 (Darling & Son

1888).
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Thus, not only did the arbitration not require American courts to revisit
cases that had been finally decided; it likewise had no effect against
successful participants in such cases who had not consented to the
tribunal's authority.
With this background, it is easier to consider the arguments the
Supreme Court rejected in Medellin. Leaving aside those related to
treaty interpretation, there are three: 1) that Article II's requirement that
the president "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" empowers
him to take steps necessary to implement the United States's obligation,
pursuant to Article 94 of the U.N. Charter, to comply with ICJ
judgments; 2) that, whatever the case with other treaties, those involved
in Medellin, when read with the United Nations Participation Act, "'
amounted to a delegation to the President of the authority to take steps
necessary to comply with the Avena judgment; and 3) that the President
possesses inherent authority to resolve international disputes to which the
United States is a party, and therefore has the authority to enforce an ICJ
judgment dealing with one such dispute.
B. The "Take Care" Clause Argument
The Supreme Court gave the "take care" argument fairly short
shrift, 112 and it seems difficult to maintain. In the first place, the Amicus
Brief of the United States (Amicus Brief) asserts that the President has3
the authority to decide whether or not to comply with an ICJ decision.11
This claim of discretionary authority, however, is difficult to reconcile
with the "take care" clause if that language imposes on the President the
duty to enforce the laws, as numerous authorities argue. 114 Further, it is
important to recall that the President, in his memorandum directing
action by the state courts, although claiming to act pursuant to authority
accorded him "by the Constitution and laws," characterized his action as
discharging "the international obligations" of the United States." 5 The
international obligations of the United States are not limited to those
created by treaty; they include obligations created by customary
international law. If the "Take Care" clause creates in the President the
authority to carry out an international obligation not binding as a matter
of domestic law, it is hard to see why that authority would not extend to
customary law obligations as well as to treaty obligations (even if, as

111. See 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 287-2871(2004).
112. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 532.
113. See Amicus Brief, supra note 64, at 11.
114. See Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 35960(2008).
115. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 503 (2008)
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Professor Swaine has argued, 1 6 it is possible to imagine a class of
treaties neither susceptible of judicial enforcement nor the subject of
implementing legislation but which could nonetheless provide authority
for execution by the President"'). Yet it seems clear that the courts do
not agree that the President is obliged to see that customary international
law is obeyed. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the courts
are bound by the President's determination that certain territory is subject
to the sovereignty of the United States, notwithstanding the existence of
a competing claim from another country and the Court's awareness of
the existence of rules of customary international law aimed at resolving
competing national claims to sovereignty. 118 Similarly, the Court has
held itself bound by executive determinations regarding competing
claims to sovereignty over particular territory by foreign countries,
notwithstanding its ability to decide such cases according to international
9 Even the Restatement of
law absent such an executive determination. 11
Foreign Relations Law acknowledges that there is support for the
proposition that the President is not compelled by the Constitution to
adhere to customary international law. 120
If the courts will not question presidential determinations on certain
legal questions, despite the existence of rules of customary law against
which the president's conclusion could be tested, it must follow that the
"take care" clause does not apply to rules of customary international law.
And IF a particular treaty is understood to impose on the United States
only obligations at the international level, then it is difficult to see why
that class of international obligations should be any more subject to the
"take care" clause than obligations created by customary law.

116. See Swaine, supra note 114 at 355-56.
117. Perhaps surprisingly, it appears that only one case has purported to find a treaty
that has not been legislatively implemented as providing authority for Presidential action.
The court in Ex Parte Toscano, 208 F. 938 (S.D.Cal. 1913), held that the Convention
Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land,
Oct. 18 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, authorized the President to intern troops of one of the groups
fighting in a Mexican civil war. See Toscano, 208 F. at 942-43. This result was
questioned in United States ex rel. Martinez-Angosto v. Mason, 344 F,2d 673, 681-86 (2d
Cir. N.Y. 1965). Reaching a result similar to that in Mason, the court in Sea Hunt, Inc. v.
Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 22 F.Supp. 2d 521 (E.D. Va. 1998),
refused to allow the United States to intervene in a case in which private salvors sought
salvage rights in the wrecks of certain Spanish government sailing vessels, despite the
claim by the United States that it was simply carrying out its responsibilities under a
friendship treaty with Spain, id. at 522-26; in that case, however, the Court held that the
treaty did not require the United States to take such action. See id. at 526.
118. SeeJones v. U.S., 137 U.S. 202,215, 221 (1890).
119. See Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415, 418,420 (1839).
120.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., § 115, rep.

note. 3 (1987).
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In this connection, it is important to stress that the conclusion that
the President was obliged to "take care" that customary international law
was obeyed would have sweeping consequences, simultaneously raising
the possibility of a vast expansion of Presidential authority domestically
and of a severe diminution of the ability of the United States to play a
part in the creation of customary international law.
The content of customary international law is much disputed;
indeed, authorities on the subject do not even agree as to the sources to
be consulted in order to determine that content. 21 This degree of
uncertainty means that there is at least some support for the existence of
rules of international law covering a very broad range of activities. And
that fact in turn means that there would be many, many cases in which a
President could assert, with some support, that particular actions by some
governmental unit in the United States had violated international law,
triggering his authority to require that governmental unit to correct the
violation. Moreover, if the Supreme Court were to couple an acceptance
of claims of the scope of Presidential power asserted by the Amicus Brief
with a decision to accord executive branch interpretations of customary
international law the same deference it gives to executive treaty
interpretations, 22 the inevitable effect would be a vast expansion of
presidential power.
Paradoxically, applying a mandatory "take care" obligation to rules
of international law could also limit the President's discretion to an
undesirable extent. This result follows from a feature of customary
international law which will seem peculiar to persons familiar only with
the American domestic legal system, that is, that one of the ways in
which the content of customary international law is altered over time is
through its violation. 123 As Professor Charney argued many years ago,
In the international system, the United States must have the power to
engage in the lawmaking process. This participation may involve
actions that put the United States in violation of existing customary
international law. If the executive branch is restrained by the rule
that customary international law is domestic law of the United States

121.

For accounts of the controversies regarding the content and manner of creation

of non-treaty international law, see J. Patrick Kelly, Naturalism in International
Adjudication, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 395, 398-407 (2008); Dinah Shelton,
Normative Hierarchyin InternationalLaw, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 291 (2006).
122. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 513.
123. See Jonathan I. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States
Government to Violate Customary InternationalLaw, 80 Am. J. INT'L L. 913, 914-17

(2006).
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and that it may not be violated, U.S. participation in the international
124
system will be handicapped.
Obviously, any reading of the "take care" clause that applied it to purely
international obligations would have just this effect.
Medellin's brief sought to frame an argument supporting the
President's actions based on the "take care clause," but failed to address
the implications of recognizing a "take care" obligation in circumstances
It also attempted to portray the President's
such as these. 125
memorandum as "showing proper respect for state functions" and as not
making law, thus failing to confront the full sweep of the President's
action, discussed above. 26 Similarly, Professor Swaine in a provocative
article asserts that "if Article 94 ... impose[s] an international legal
obligation, it would ordinarily comprise a 'law' that the President must
execute under the Take Care Clause,' 127 not addressing the authority
inconsistent with the argument that the President's discretion is
controlled by international law. And, while he acknowledges the
importance of observing Constitutional restrictions on presidential
authority, 128 he does not address the federalism and separation of powers
issues presented by a Presidential determination that a state court must
alter its procedural law and re-open a particular final judgment.
The DelegationArgument

C.

As noted above, the Court rejected the government's delegation
argument because the non-self-executing character of the treaties in
which the government purported to find delegations of authority was
seen as evincing an intent that those treaties have no domestic law effect,
and thus as inconsistent with any intent in the treaty-makers to delegate
to the President the power to decide to create domestic law effects
because of the international obligations those treaties created. The Court
rejected a companion argument based on Congressional acquiescence in
Presidential reactions to previous ICJ rulings on the grounds that the
President's actions in those earlier cases were utterly different from those
involved in Medellin. 129 It likewise rejected an argument grounded on
the authority given to the President by the U.N. Participation Act to
represent the United States before U.N. organs because that Act could

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 917
See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 532.
See id.
Swaine, supra note 114, at 379.
Id. at 357-58.
See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 519.
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not be read as creating unilateral Presidential authority to make domestic
law. 130
13
This analysis is unsatisfactory. As Professor Wuerth has noted, '
to label a treaty as non-self-executing, while it necessarily implies that
the Senate would have assumed that the treaty could not be applied by
the Courts without further legislation, does not necessarily indicate that
the Senate had any particular attitude toward Presidential implementation
of the treaty.132 The Court itself defined "a non-self-executing treaty" as
one that "does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal
law,"'133 a definition that seems hard to square with the inference the
Court draws from the treaties' non-self-executing character. That
inference would seem to require that a Senatorial understanding that a
treaty was non-self-executing be equated with an active Senatorial intent
that the treaty not be domestically enforceable absent further
Congressional action. It is certainly possible that the Senate had no
intent regarding this matter one way or the other.
To say that the Court's discussion on the delegation point was weak
does not, however, necessarily mean that its conclusion on that point was
wrong. In fact, there are at least two arguments against seeing the
delegation for which the Government contended.
First, and most obviously, neither the treaties at issue nor the U.N.
Participation Act say anything at all about delegation. While the status
of the non-delegation doctrine in Constitutional law is, at best, uncertain,
the Supreme Court has at least insisted on an express statutory grant of
authority to the Executive to regulate something as a prerequisite for
134
seeing the Executive as having been delegated law-making authority.
Second, as discussed in detail below, there is a strong argument that the
power the President purported to exercise through the issuance of his
memorandum could be classed as judicial. To the extent that this
130. See id. at 525-26.
131. Ingrid Wuerth, Medellin: The New, New Formalism?, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 1 (2009).
132. See id. at 6-7.
133. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 519, n. 3.
134. See U.S. v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001) (observing that the Court has
most often held administrative actions to be valid delegations of legislative authority
when the actions have been taken pursuant to a Congressional authorization for the
agency in question to engage in notice and comment rule-making).
The Court
acknowledges that it has not always required authorization to engage in such rule-making
as a prerequisite for finding a delegation of legislative authority; however, it illustrates
this point by citing to a case in which the administrator was expressly authorized to
regulate the area as to which the issue had arisen. See id at 230-31 (citing Nationsbank of
N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1995)). That is, the Court
did not rely for this point on a case dealing with a statute which provided the relevant
executive agency without express authority to take some sort of action.
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characterization is correct, the question arises, from what source would
the treaty-makers derive the authority to delegate judicial power?
Delegation, after all, refers to authorizing someone else to do something
one is oneself entitled to do-but the treaty-makers are not authorized to
exercise judicial power. A third problem with delegation in this context
is that the delegation in question is to the President, while it is the
President who makes the treaties at issue. That is, recognizing such a
power thus permits the President to, in effect, confer upon himself the
power of Congress, if executing a treaty is equated to legislation, or,
perhaps, the power of the judiciary. Of course, it might be argued that,
since the President is forbidden to ratify a treaty without Senate consent,
one-third plus one of the members of the Senate could prevent a
questionable delegation by treaty. Nonetheless, one might wonder about
finding a delegation to the President through a process in which the
President plays the primary role.
Responses to these arguments against delegation seem to be
difficult to frame. They are not to be found in the Amicus Brief which
simply asserts that the President has the authority he claimed, without
really defending the proposition. 35 However, Professor Stephan has
also addressed the delegation argument, and put more effort into
defending it than did the government. He first points to the President's
authority to bring and defend claims before the ICJ, and asserts that,
"Inferring the existence of a capacity to settle a dispute with which an
international tribunal is seized from an express authority to bring and
' 13 6
defend claims in that tribunal does not seem all that great a stretch."
He goes on to argue that the established authority of the President to
settle certain international claims should be seen as "illuminat[ing] the
background understanding" of the Senate when it consented to
ratification of the treaties at issue in Medellin, thereby supporting the
inference that those treaties delegated to the President the discretionary
37
authority to decide whether and how to comply with ICJ judgments.1
He sees such a delegation as entailing "fairly clear standards, subject to
135. Regarding the treaties at issue, the Amicus Brief merely states that "The
Optional Protocol and the U.N. Charter create an obligation to comply with Avena, and
those treaties implicitly give the President authority on behalf of the Nation," Amicus
Brief, supra note 64, at 11. That brief goes on to assert that, since "Congress has
expressly authorized the President to direct all functions connected with the United
States' (sic) participation in the United Nations." Id. at 16 (citing 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 287,
287a (2004)). Since the President would have the responsibility of seeing to the
enforcement of an ICJ judgment in a case where the United States won, logically, he
should have authority to enforce an ICJ judgment in a case the United States loses. See
id. at 17.
136. Paul B. Stephan, Symposium: Treaties and Domestic Law After Medellin v.
Texas: Open Doors, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 11,26-27 (2009).
137. See id. at 27.
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judicial review, setting limits to this authority. The President could not,
for example, use the ICJ order requiring further review of tainted
convictions as a pretext for commuting a death sentence."' 138 He argues
that such a reading does not require seeing the President as entitled to
make law on any subject covered by a treaty, since the authority could be
limited to treaties containing express agreements to binding dispute
resolution. 139 He argues, further, that arguments based on the breadth
and unprecedented character of applying such executive authority to state
criminal proceedings overlook the President's well-established authority
"to intervene in state criminal proceedings" by extraditing a person
pursuant to an extradition
treaty even if that person is a defendant in an
40
ongoing criminal trial. 1
Professor Stephan acknowledges that Congress's delegation of
authority to the President in perhaps the best known case addressing
delegations in the realm of international affairs, United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 141 was express, but argues against imposing such a
requirement on treaties committing the United States to resolving
disputes through binding third-party settlements. 142 In support of that
argument, he cites Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.143 as standing for the proposition that Congressional
allocations of responsibilities to Executive agencies implicitly authorize
those agencies to promulgate binding interpretations of the allocating
statute, and characterizes the Optional Protocol, the U.N. Charter, and
the U.N. Participation Act as allocating such administrative authority to
interpret the treaties, including the authority to read the treaties as
implicitly delegating to the President discretion to enforce ICJ
judgments.144 He also notes that it is unreasonable to look for explicit
delegations in treaties since, as international instruments, treaties are
very unlikely to address the modes of domestic enforcement of each of
the treaty parties. 145
These arguments do not work. To say that the capacity to settle
may be inferred from authority to bring and defend claims cannot be
correct, since there are some types of settlement to which the President
clearly could not obligate the country on his own authority, for example,
a settlement requiring the payment of money. Of course, Professor
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
(1984).
144.
145.

Id. at 27-28.
See id. at 28-29.
See id. at 29.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
See Stephan, supra note 136, at 24.
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
See Stephan, supra note 136, at 30-3 1.
See id. at 3 1.
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Stephan acknowledges that some limits on such authority must exist, but
he explains neither the source of nor the nature of such limits; without
some articulable limiting principle, it is hard to see what standard would
exist for the judicial review he posits. To be sure, he provides an
example of an action which he believes would go beyond the authority
delegated in the context of Medellin, that is, that the President could not
use the Avena judgment as a "pretext" for commuting a death sentence.
But suppose a particular defendant could point to the disappearance,
since his trial, of evidence which might have been seen by a sentencing
jury as establishing the presence of a mitigating factor but which could
have been available only through the assistance of his government-why
would the President's authority to implement Avena not permit
commutation in such circumstances?
The argument based on the Senate's "background understanding"
cannot be reconciled with the actual legislative history of the treaties
here at issue. Not only is there no mention of such an understanding in
these materials, but, as the Court notes in Medellin, Executive Branch
testimony at the hearings on the U.N. Charter and the consent to the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ addressing the question of
enforcement of ICJ judgments refer only to enforcement by the Security
Council. 146 The Senate's debate on acceptance of the ICJ's compulsory
jurisdiction also indicates that the Senate also understood that ICJ
judgments could only be enforced by the Security Council. 147 Nor does
Senate consideration of the Optional Protocol support Professor
Stephan's argument, since the Committee report recommending that the
Senate consent to ratification of that treaty states only that the Consular
Convention "does not change or affect present U.S. laws or practice.' 4 8
An affirmative understanding that ICJ judgments can be enforced only
through the Security Council and that adherence to the Optional Protocol
did not change U.S. law is hard to square with an implicit delegation to
the President of the authority to change U.S. law, at his discretion, if
necessary to enforce ICJ judgments.
The analogy to extradition is also problematic. If the United States
extradites someone in the middle of a criminal trial in which he is the
defendant, it is not taking part in that trial. In this case, however, the
President did not remove Medellin from the Texas judicial system, but
purported to insert himself into that system and, in essence, take it over.
Finally, and most fundamentally, and as Professor Stephan states,
any delegation of the authority in question would have to be implicit,
146.
147.
148.

See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506-07 (2008).
See 92 CoNG. REc. 10694-95 (1946).
S. REP. No. 91-9, at 2 (1969).
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since no statute or treaty contains an express delegation and, we might
add, there is a similar silence on this point in the legislative histories of
all of the relevant treaties. 149 However, as noted above, the Supreme
Court has demanded some explicit grant of regulatory authority before
finding a delegation. Professor Stephan's discussion of Chevron does
not really deal with this point. The question in that case was not whether
the agency had been delegated authority to issue regulations, which was
not disputed; rather, the Court had to determine the weight it should
150
place on those regulations in interpreting the underlying statute.
Chevron is therefore hardly authority for the proposition that a legislative
action that explicitly delegates nothing should be read as delegating
lawmaking authority. Further, while it may be unreasonable to look in
treaty language for delegations of authority to the President, it is surely
not unreasonable to look for discussion of the issue in Senate hearings
and debate on a treaty, and on Senate committee reports concerning a
treaty-and in this case, all of those sources cut against delegation
arguments.
D. Inherent PresidentialAuthority
The last argument the government raised to defend the President's
Memorandum was to assert that it fell within the President's authorities
to resolve disputes over international claims. 151 In rejecting that
argument, the Court first observed that the cases on which the
government relied all involved claims by American citizens against
foreign governments. 152 It stressed, further, that the practice was not
only long-standing, but reflected an equally lengthy period of
Congressional acquiescence in such executive actions. 153 The sort of
action the President sought to take in this case, however, was, as the
government conceded, unprecedented, and thus could not be
characterized as behavior in which Congress had acquiesced for a long
time. 154
Certainly, these distinctions are accurate, but the Court never
explained why the situation in Medellin was so different from those
presented by the cases cited by the government as to require a different
result. There are, however, arguments that were available to the Court to
fortify its conclusion.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See Stephan, supra note 136, at 30-31.
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-47.
See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 529.
See id. at 530-32.
See id.
Seeid. at 532.
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In the first place, the Court speaks too conservatively when it
characterizes the Congressional reaction to these Presidential claim
settlement arrangements as "acquiescence." A more accurate term would
be facilitation. Thus, in the case of the Litvinov Assignment, addressed
Congress by joint resolution provided for the
in U.S. v. Pink,'
appointment of a commissioner "to determine the validity and amounts
of claims by American nationals against the Government of the Union of
,,156 The Court in Dames & Moore v.
Soviet Socialist Republics.
57
Regan1 details the long history of both Presidential settlements of
American citizens' claims against foreign governments and the
Congressional enactments that recognized the President's authority in
this regard and provided the58machinery for implementing the settlements
the President had obtained. 1
More fundamentally, it is crucial to focus on the background against
which such settlements have taken place throughout most of the history
of the United States. Until 1952,1 59 the United States accorded foreign
countries absolute immunity against suit in both state and federal courts.
Americans with a claim against a foreign government, therefore, could
not pursue them in American courts. Unless claimants were willing to
take their chances in the foreign country's judicial system, their only
hope of realizing on their claims was for the United States government to
take the claims up with the foreign country concerned. The only impact
in the United States of such government efforts was that Americans who
would otherwise have little chance of seeing their claims vindicated
could hope that they might end up with something. The President's
resolving of such claims, in other words, involved no interference with
anything happening in any judicial system in the United States; it was
instead a mode of relief for persons for whom the judicial system could
provide no aid. Even under current law permitting claims against foreign
governments in a number of circumstances, persons with claims against
foreign governments not listed as state sponsors of terrorism based on
alleged torts within the foreign government's territory; persons with
commercial claims against foreign governments, which claims have no
relationship to the United States other than the residence of the claimant;
and persons with claims based on expropriations when the expropriated
U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 227-28 (1942).
156. Joint Resolution to Provide for the Adjudication by a Commissioner of Claims of
American Nationals Against the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
S.J. Res 53, 75th Cong. (1939).
157. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
155.

158.

Id. at 680-82.

159. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. State Dept., to Acting
Atty Gen'l Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprintedin 26 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 984,
984-85 (1952).
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property (or property exchanged for it) is not within the United States,
will find that the foreign countries against which they wish to bring
claims are immune from suit. 160 In such cases, action by the President is
the only way such claims may be vindicated.
In contrast, the situation in Medellin was not one where the
President was acting because of the impossibility of judicial proceedings
in the United States. To the contrary, he was seeking to reopen
proceedings already complete and compel the courts involved to
reexamine judgments all ready rendered. Simply to state the distinction
makes clear that the latter type of action raises questions regarding the
domestic effect of executive actions which the former will rarely
present. 161
A final problem with the inherent power argument is that claims of
discretionary executive authority to ignore the concept of res judiciata,
to require state courts to alter their procedures, and to direct those courts
as to how to proceed in individual cases raise fundamental problems of
federalism and of separation of powers. To the extent the Memorandum
is seen as an attempt at presidential law-making, it presents the problems
such attempts always present, that is, those of identifying the source and
scope of the asserted legislative authority. However, the Memorandum
could also be seen as amounting to a claim to the exercise of judicial
authority, as noted above. Attempts by the executive to claim judicial
authority, however, are less familiar than attempts to exercise legislative
authority, and the complications they present therefore require more
discussion.
160. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2009).
161. It might be argued that the very fact that the Supreme Court has decided cases in
this area demonstrates that the argument in the text must be incorrect. If there can be no
American litigation in such cases, how could matters come before the Supreme Court in
the first place? The response is that the Supreme Court cases in question each dealt with
unusual circumstances. The line of cases culminating in U.S. v. Pink is not to the
contrary. See generally Pink,U.S.315 203. Those cases involved litigation by the United
States to obtain possession of property intended to be used to pay claims against the
Soviet Union. The persons opposing the United States were making no claims against
the Soviet Union; rather, their claims were against the entities whose assets the United
States sought to take. Similarly, American Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003),
involved claims against foreign private entities subject to personal jurisdiction in this
country; claims against them became the subject of negotiations with a foreign
government only because of the close interaction between the predecessors of the
defendants and the foreign government at the time the alleged wrong was done. See id. at
405-12,415-16. Only Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), involved a suit by
an American concern against a foreign government, and even there, the President
transferred out of the United States all the property against which plaintiffs might have
executed a judgment - an action taken as part of a plan for resolving all American claims
against Iran, which the Court held to be clearly within the President's authority. See id.
669-75. This meant that the plaintiffs could obtain relief only through the process the
President had negotiated. See id. at 662-67, 686-87.
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A reasonable place to start is with the Supreme Court's holding in
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 162 which held unconstitutional a federal
statute purporting to re-open certain private civil suits brought under the
federal securities laws and dismissed by the federal courts as time
barred. 163 In particular, the Court stated:
Article III establishes a "judicial department" with the "province and
duty... to say what the law is" in particular cases and controversies.
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). The record of
history shows that the Framers crafted this charter of the judicial
department with an expressed understanding that it gives the Federal
Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them,
subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III
hierarchy-with an understanding, in short, that "a judgment
conclusively resolves the case" because "a 'judicial Power' is one to
render dispositive judgments." 164
The opinion goes on:
Having achieved finality, however, a judicial decision becomes the
last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular case or
controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation
that the law applicable to that very case was something other than
what the courts said it was. Finality of a legal judgment is
determined by statute, just as entitlement to a government benefit is a
statutory creation; but that no more deprives the former of its
constitutional significance for separation-of-powers analysis than it
purposes. 165
deprives the latter of its significance for due process
The vice of the statute at issue in Plaut, then, was that it amounted to an
assumption by Congress of the authority to nullify what the Court
considered a core power of the judiciary; the difficulty was not that there
would be some sort of effect on an otherwise final judgment, but that the
department166purporting to cause that effect was the Legislature, not the
Judiciary.
Of course, Plaut involved an attempt to reopen final federal
judgments by Congress, rather than an effort by the President to re-open
final state judgments, but that distinction makes no difference in these
circumstances. It has been clear at least since Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee 167 that the judicial power of the United States includes the

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
See id. at 213-15,217-19.
Id. at 218-219 (emphasis in the original).
Id. at 227 (emphasis in the original).
See id. at 227, 233-34.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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authority of the Supreme Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over
state court decisions falling within the class of cases included with the
judicial power by clause 2 of Article III of the Constitution' 68-a group
that, of course, includes cases arising under treaties. 69 Similarly,
Marbury v. Madison170 explains that "It is the essential criterion of
appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a
cause already instituted, and does not create that cause."' 71 By asserting
the authority to "revise and correct" the judgment of the Texas courts in
a case involving a treaty, that is, a case falling within the federal judicial
power, the President was effectively attempting to exercise the federal
judicial power. To be sure, the President purported only to direct the
Texas courts to provide "review and reconsideration" in Medellin's case,
but, according to Plaut,one of the reasons for the Constitution's stress on
the separation of powers was a habit of state legislatures in the preConstitutional period of requiring the reopening of particular cases. 172 If
such actions by a legislature violate the concept of the separation of
powers, then it is difficult to see how an identical action by the President
does not.
There is a second, related aspect of the President's action that also
requires attention. If a fundamental characteristic of a judicial system is
that it possesses the authority to finally resolve matters before it, the
President's memorandum-operating as it did to deprive the state
judgments in question of finality-amounted to a claim of executive
authority to strip state judiciaries of their judicial character. In this
connection, it is crucial to repeat that the President denied that American
law required the states to afford Medellin any relief absent Presidential
action. Rather, he claimed that state judges, so far from being
independent, were subject to his control, and further that this subjection
derived from his own individual authority, without action even by
Congress. And in claiming the authority to terminate the independence
of state judges, the President was effectively claiming the authority to
rearrange the most fundamental aspects of the states' governmental
structures.
There is at least some reason to doubt whether the Constitution
would permit the federal government to so gravely alter the character of
state judiciaries even by treaty. 173 State courts' judgments can be
168. See id. at 337-42.
169. See U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2.
170. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
171. Id. at 175.
172. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219-25.
173. For a discussion of this point, see A. Mark Weisburd, International Courts and
American Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 877, 891-924 (2000); see also Michael D.
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reviewed by the Supreme Court, after all, only because Article III of the
Constitution requires the creation of the Court, defines the judicial power
of the United States as extending to all cases arising under the
Constitution and under the laws or treaties of the United States, and
permits Congress to vest in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction in
all cases falling within the judicial power. 174 Nothing in the Constitution
purports to confer even on Congress general authority to control the
jurisdiction and procedure of state courts. And, as I have argued
elsewhere, while I do not agree that the treaty power is subject to the
same limitations as is Congress under Article I, it seems to me that
federalism limitations on the treaty makers are looser than those imposed
on Congress only in that the treaty makers may address a broader range
of questions of substantive law than can Congress, and thus can
supersede state rules of law to a greater extent than Congress can; there
are respectable arguments that the treaty power is not a warrant for
imposing on the states fundamental changes in the structures of their
governments. 175 If there is reason to doubt that the federal government
could enact a statute or conclude a treaty requiring states to re-open
closed cases because of an international tribunal's determination, it is
difficult to see how the President has the authority to achieve an identical
result in a case where he admits that no statute or treaty obliges the state
to act as he directs.
If these were the only issues presented by this case, it would be
significant enough. However, it is important to remember that the
relevant international legal instruments make no distinctions between
international claims deriving from federal cases and those deriving from
state cases. If circumstances can arise in which the ICJ concludes that an
American state court must provide "review and reconsideration" in a
particular case, it would seem that such a result could also happen when
the relevant court was federal. Further, it would seem that the executive
power arguments raised by the United States to defend the President's
memorandum in Medellin do not in themselves depend on any principle
that would require a different result if the President had issued his
directive to federal courts rather than to state courts. 17 6 Indeed, if the
President's claim settlement authority were seen to apply in this case, it
is worth remembering that the Supreme Court has held that Presidential

Ramsey, Missouri v. Holland and Historical Textualism Symposium: Return to Missouri
v. Holland: Federalism and InternationalLaw, 73 Mo. L. REV. 969, 980 (2008).
174. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1,2, cls. 1,2.
175. See Weisburd, supra note 173, at 912-13, 916-24.
176. Of course, federal statutory limitations on the federal courts' operation may
provide such a principle.
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authority in this area can provide rules of decision in federal cases. 7 7 In
short, a modest extension of the authority the President claimed in
Medellin could squarely present a conflict between the executive and the
judicial branches of the federal government over fundamental questions
of authority.
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The foregoing discussion critiques the Court's opinion in Medellin
and describes possible consequences if the Court had upheld the
authority the President claimed when he issued his memorandum. But
the question of what this decision portends for the future is rather more
important than that of what might have happened had the Court reached
the opposite result. This section addresses that question.
Preliminarily, it is appropriate to note that Medellin appears to have
no effect on the ability of the President to participate, on behalf of the
United States, in the process by which customary international law is
made. The Court's stress on the lack of Presidential authority to make9
law178 is clearly addressed to law-making in the domestic context.
The Court is equally clear in emphasizing the scope of Presidential
authority 80regarding international affairs outside the domestic law-making
context. 1
Turning, then, to subjects where Medellin should have some impact,
we begin by restating the holdings of the case. They were: 1) a non-selfexecuting treaty may not be construed as delegating to the President the
authority to create law binding on American courts; 2) a statute
empowering the President to represent the United States at an
international organization does not, of itself, confer on him the authority
to make legal rules deemed necessary to comply with an international
legal obligation created by a judgment of a court which is an organ of the
international organization; and 3) because the cases holding that
executive orders issued by the President solely on his own authority preempt inconsistent state law involved a practice in which Congress has
acquiesced for a very long time, they are not authority for the proposition
that any action by the President taken with a view to addressing an
international law obligation of the United States has the domestic effect
of displacing state law. 181 The Court also seemed to put weight on the
fact that the Memorandum "reaches deep into the heart of the State's

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1981).
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 527-28 (2008).
See, e.g., id. at 529-30.
See id. at 523-24, 529-30.
See supra Part IV.
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police powers and compels state courts to reopen8 2final criminal
judgments and set aside neutrally applicable state laws."
A.

Limiting Garamendi
One fairly clear consequence of Medellin is that the very broad

language used in American Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi 83 no longer carries
weight. Garamendi arose out of efforts to resolve claims of Holocaust
victims against, among others, certain German insurance companies.
The federal government negotiated a sole executive agreement (that is,
an international agreement concluded by the President solely on his own
authority without participation either of Congress or of two-thirds of the
Senate 84) with Germany and with the insurance companies to address
the matter. More or less simultaneously, California enacted statutes
permitting suits to recover on Holocaust-related insurance claims and
requiring insurance companies then doing business in California to file
massive disclosures regarding insurance policies issued either by the
companies or by their current affiliated companies from 1920 through
1945. 185 The penalties for failure to make the required disclosures were
draconian. The affected insurance companies sought an injunction
against the application of the state statutes from a federal
court, and the
86
matter eventually made its way to the Supreme Court. 1
In holding the California statutes unconstitutional, the Court stated
that "the likelihood that state legislation will produce something more
than incidental effect in conflict with express foreign policy of the
National Government would require preemption of state law."', 87 The
Court took this position, moreover, even though the relevant executive
agreement, though providing clear evidence of the policy of the Federal
government, did not purport to establish a legal rule inconsistent with the
State's law. 188 To complicate matters, Garamendidoes not really make
clear how much its result depended on the unusual nature of the relevant
state statute. To be sure, it stresses that "quite unlike a generally
applicable 'blue sky' law, [the California statute] singles out only
policies issued by European companies, in Europe, to European
residents, at least 55 years ago."' 89 This language follows, however, the
182. Id. at 532.
183.

American Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)

184.

See, e.g.,

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 115 reporter's note 4.
185. See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 401.
186. Seeid. at412-13.

187.

Id. at 420.

188.
189.

Seeid. at416-17.
Id. at 425-26.
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statement that "the express federal policy and the clear conflict raised by
the state statute are alone enough to require state law to yield." 190 The
opinion cites "the weakness of the state's interest, against the backdrop
of traditional state legislative subject matter, in regulating disclosure of
only to resolve any
European Holocaust-era insurance policies . . .91 92
doubts about the clarity of the state-federal conflict. 1
Taken literally, the reach of this decision is extremely broad. Since
Garamendi speaks only in terns of federal foreign policy, and does not
require express preemption, the only way to determine whether any
particular state statute would be preempted under this standard would be
for a court to attempt to determine the contours of federal policy.
Presumably, the fact that the policy was unclear, or had been stated only
at the most abstract level, would not excuse state legislators and federal
judges from figuring out what the federal policy was and what counted as
a conflict. Furthermore, literal application of the "state legislation...
produc[ing] something more than incidental effect in conflict with
express foreign policy of the National Government" language would
mean that any aspect of state law could be seen as giving rise to a
conflict, including neutral statutes directed at regulating a broad range of
activity that, by happenstance, included activities covered by the federal
policy. 193 Of course, the statute in question in Garamendiwas not such a
statute, but the Court seems to say that, while the character of the statute
at issue in Garamendi helped to make the conflict clear, a conflict raised
by any state statute would require preemption. Obviously, such a
standard is at once too vague and too sweeping to be applied without
tremendous difficulty.
Medellin clearly presented a case where the Texas statutes
precluding Medellin from obtaining the hearing required by Avena were
"in conflict with the express foreign policy of the National
Government." ' 194
Indeed, the conflict was clearer than that in
Garamendi, since the President, in the interest of foreign policy,
purported to expressly supersede the Texas statute. Instead of applying
the Garamendi language, however, the Court held the President's action
unconstitutional.
Furthermore, Medellin characterizes Garamendi
simply as a case involving Presidential settlement of Americans' claims
against foreign governments or foreign citizens,195 and makes no
reference to Garamendi'sbroad language. Under these circumstances, it
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 425.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 420.
Id.
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 492, 530 (2008).
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seems impossible to see the broad standard enunciated in Garamendi as
by commentators
surviving Medellin, a development welcomed even
196
result.
Medellin
the
about
otherwise unenthusiastic
B.

Domestic Law Status of Sole Executive Agreements

There has been a degree of uncertainty about the place in American
for
sole executive agreements. The circumstances in which such an
law
agreement could displace state law, and even whether the agreements
could have some impact on pre-existing federal law, have not been
entirely clear. Medellin seems to clarify the status of such agreements.
The Court distinguishes the cases holding that sole executive agreements
preempt state law as all involving situations in which the agreement was
intended to resolve the claims of American citizens against the country
and, perhaps, certain of its nationals, with which the agreement was
concluded. 197 The Court, further, stressed that a crucial factor supporting
the effect of such agreements was the fact of Congressional acceptance
of the President's authority to make them over a very long period of
time. 198 While Dames & Moore took note of the long-standing character
of the practice,' 99 Medellin was the first case to hold expressly that the
absence of a comparable history of Congressional comfort was
inconsistent with the existence of the authority the President claimed.200
This holding therefore makes clear the circumstances in which the
President, acting unilaterally, may displace state law. Furthermore, since
there is apparently no history of Congressional acquiescence in
Presidential preemption of state law in any field other than that of
settlement of American citizens' claims against foreign governments,
there seems to be no other subject on which the President has equivalent
authority.
C.

"Re-interpretation" of Treaties

In the mid- 1980's, a dispute arose between the United States and the
Soviet Union and, more to the point of this paper, within the United
States, over the proper interpretation of the AntiBallistic Missile
Treaty.20 1 The Reagan Administration, which had the previous year
announced its intention of developing a defense against ballistic missile
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See Stephan, supra note 136, at 28, n. 57; Wuerth, supra note 131, at 5-6.
See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531.
See id.
See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680-82.
See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 532.
Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-U.S.S.R. May

26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435.

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:4

attacks, took the position that the reading of the Treaty to which the
United States had publicly adhered since the Treaty was concluded was,
upon examination, incorrect; according to the Administration, the Treaty
did not, in fact, restrict activities regarding missile defense to the extent
that the United States had previously consistently asserted.2 °2 Although
most of the discussion revolved around the correctness of the new
interpretation and its implications for arms control, questions were also
raised about the permissibility of the Executive Branch asserting, after
the conclusion of a treaty, that the proper reading of the treaty was quite
different from that explained to the Senate by Executive Branch
witnesses during the process of consenting to ratification and upon which
the Senate relied in deciding to consent.2 °3
Arguably, the court's analysis in Medellin is relevant to this
question, should it ever arise again. First, digressing from the focus of
this article, aspects of the Court's treatment of the question whether
Article 94 is self-executing are relevant to this matter.
In that
connection, although the Court, in its analysis of the argument that
Article 94 was self-executing, stated that "the United States' [sic]
interpretation of a treaty 'is entitled to great weight,' 20 4 it stressed that
the Executive had "unfailingly" adhered to the interpretation of the
relevant treaties which it urged in the case and which the Court
ultimately accepted.205
One may infer that a later Executive
interpretation which differed fundamentally from earlier Executive
interpretations would raise questions not at issue in Medellin.
More to the point of this article, the Medellin Court's discussion of
the Government's delegation argument seems inconsistent with any
authority in the Executive to alter its understanding of a treaty after
ratification. The Court stressed that, because the Senate consented to
ratification of the relevant treaties on the understanding that they were
non-self-executing, the President lacked the authority to execute them
unilaterally.20 6 However, if the Senate's understanding of a treaty at the
time of Senatorial consent to ratification determines whether the treaty is
self-executing, it would seem that the Senate's understanding would
likewise control the American understanding of the substance of the
treaty. It is difficult to see a difference between the President's claiming
the authority to execute a treaty the Senate understood to be non-self202. For discussion of these events, see Michael R. Gordon, A Tug of War Erupts on
Missile Treaty Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 15, 1986, at A20; Anthony Lewis, Abroad at
Home: Arms Control Tricks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1986, at A17.
203. Gordon, supra note 202.
204. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 513.
205. See id.
206. See id. at 526-27.
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executing, and the President's claiming the authority to assert that a
treaty means "X" when the Senate understood the treaty to mean "Y."
Of course, this conclusion says nothing about how one would go about
determining what the Senate's understanding was; it asserts only that the
President lacks the authority to attribute to a treaty a meaning different
from the Senate's understanding, however that understanding was
determined.
D. Scope of the President's War Power
In recent years, the Court has handed down several decisions
rejecting President Bush's claims of extensive authority to, in effect,
make law as an aspect of his authority as Commander-in-Chief. Thus,
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 20 7 held that an American citizen alleged to be an
"enemy combatant" captured on the battlefield and detained by
Presidential order was protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment 20 8 and entitled to "receive notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual
assertions before a neutral decision-maker,, 20 9 even though the Court
saw the detention as authorized by Congress. 210 Boumediene v. Bush
further held that aliens alleged to be enemy combatants and detained at
Guantanamo Bay were entitled to have access to a proceeding in which
they could "challenge the President's legal authority to detain them,
contest the [decision-maker's] findings of fact, supplement the record on
review with exculpatory evidence, and request an order of release... "
even if a statute purported to limit them to a proceeding in which those
rights were denied.2 1'
The holding in Medellin appears to reinforce the teaching of these
cases. These cases necessarily must be understood as holding that the
President's commander-in-chief powers, even if reinforced by statute, do
not permit him to disregard the structure of the Constitution by attempted
circumvention of the clause limiting the authority of Congress to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus.2 12 Similarly, Medellin holds that the
President's foreign affairs power does not permit him to require state
judiciaries to alter their procedures in particular cases absent, at least,
some action by Congress.2t 3 Indeed, the Court turned to the quotation in
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210.
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Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
See id. 528-29.
Id. at 533.
Seeid. at516-17.
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2292 (2008).
2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
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Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 214 (another of the war power cases) 21 5 from Ex
parte Milligan2 16 in holding that the decision whether to execute a nonself-executing treaty was "governed by the fundamental constitutional
principle that "'[t]he power to make the necessary laws is in Congress;
the power to execute in the President.' ' 2 17 As important as it is,
therefore, Medellin cannot be seen in isolation. Rather, it reflects the
Court's concern throughout the mid-2000's with underlining the
principle that the powers of the President are not all-encompassing; the
war powers cases apply that rule to Presidential claims based on those
powers, while Medellin218applies it to claims based on the President's
foreign policy authority.
VI. CONCLUSION
Medellin held that President Bush lacked the authority to take an
action none of his predecessors had ever attempted to take. One might
think that the determination that presidents lack a power which they have
done without for over two hundred years is unlikely to have much impact
on the future of the Republic. This conclusion, however, understates the
stakes in Medellin.
As discussed at length in this paper, the power the President sought
to exercise had characteristics of both legislative and judicial power. He
sought this power, moreover, in order to carry out an obligation which he
characterized as not binding in domestic law, but effective exclusively as
the international level. For the Court to have recognized such a power
would have raised serious questions about the possibility of imposing
any limits on executive actions alleged to have been taken in order to
comply with international legal obligations.
Less apparent on the surface of the case, however, but equally as
important, is a different issue: what is the formal role international
institutions play in American political life? Had the Court held that the
President could implement an ICJ judgment that was not binding in
214. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 591 (2006).
215. Hamdan held that military commissions the President proposed to establish to
try alleged alien enemy combatants violated the then-governing statute, id. at 590-95,
617-35.
216. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866).
217. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 526 (quoting Hamdan 548 U.S. at 591).
218. Professor Cerone has suggested that Medellin might reflect an invocation of
"international law to expand [presidential] authority, both externally and internally, while
rejecting the limitations imposed by international law." John Cerone, Making Sense of
the U.S. President'sIntervention in Medellin, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 279, 280
(2008). To the extent that he sees the President's memorandum in Medellin as being of a
piece with the Bush administration's broad claims of executive power to deal with
terrorism, I agree.
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domestic law and the implementation of which had not been authorized
by Congress, it would essentially have treated the ICJ as the equivalent
of a domestic court. Both state and federal executive authorities
routinely execute judgments of their respective courts; had execution of
the ICJ's judgment been treated as equally routine, it would have been
hard to see the practical difference between the effects of an ICJ
judgment and the effects of a decision by a federal court.
In rejecting the President's claim, then, the Supreme Court was not
simply denying the President a power that had never been thought
necessary. It was also holding that, in the current state of American law,
Americans are not obliged to alter their domestic legal system in
deference to an international tribunal unless Congress chooses to create
such an obligation.

